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Abstract:  Voice over IP (VoIP) is the technology allowing 
voice and multimedia transmissions as data packets over a 
private or a public IP network. Thanks to the benefits that it 
may provide, the VoIP technology is increasingly attracting 
attention and interest in the industry. Actually, VoIP allows 
significant benefits for customers and communication services 
providers such as cost savings, rich media service, phone and 
service portability, mobility, and the integration with other 
applications. Nevertheless, the deployment of the VoIP 
technology encounters many challenges such as architecture 
complexity, interoperability issues, QoS issues, and security 
concerns. Among these disadvantages, VoIP security issues are 
becoming more serious because traditional security devices, 
protocols, and architectures cannot adequately protect VoIP 
systems from recent intelligent attacks. The aim of this paper is 
carry out a deep analysis of the security concerns of the VoIP 
technology. Firstly, we present a brief overview about the VoIP 
technology. Then, we discuss security attacks and 
vulnerabilities related to VoIP protocols and devices. After 
that, we talk about the security profiles of the VoIP protocols, 
and we present the main security components designed to help 
the deployment of a reliable and secured VoIP systems. 
 
Keywords: VoIP, Vulnerabilities, Security Attacks, 
Security Mechanisms  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Voice over IP (VoIP) [1, 2] has been prevailing in the 
telecommunication world since its emergence in the late 
90s, as a new technology transporting multimedia over the 
IP network. The reason for its prevalence is that, compared 
to legacy phone system, VoIP allows significant benefits 
such as cost savings, the provision of new media services, 
phone portability, and the integration with other 
applications [1, 2, 3]. Despite these advantages, the VoIP 
technology suffers from many hurdles such as architecture 
complexity, interoperability issues, QoS concerns, and 
security issues [1]. Among these disadvantages, VoIP 
security issues are becoming more serious because 
traditional security devices, protocols, and architectures 
cannot adequately protect VoIP systems from recent 
security attacks.  
VoIP technology is characterized by a set of 
vulnerabilities, meaning the flaws that may be exploited by 
an attacker to perform security attacks. There are two 
types of vulnerability in VoIP [1, 2]. One is the inherited 
vulnerability coming from the infrastructure (network, 
operating system, etc.) that VoIP applications are running 
on. The other is its own vulnerability coming from VoIP 
protocols and devices. All components involved in the 
deployment of VoIP service have vulnerable elements that 
affect it directly or indirectly. The main vulnerable 
components in a VoIP system are the operating system of 
the VoIP application, the VoIP application itself, the VoIP 
protocols, the management interface, and the network 
devices (switch, router). 
VoIP vulnerabilities can be exploited to create many 
different kinds of attacks. Security attacks can be 
categorized as four different types: attacks against 
availability, confidentiality, integrity, and social context 
[1, 2]. An attack against availability aims at VoIP service 
interruption, typically, in the form of Denial of Service 
(DoS). Call flooding, malformed messages, spoofed 
messages, and call hijacking are examples of attacks 
against service availability. Unlike attacks against 
availability, attacks against confidentiality do not impact 
current communications generally, but provide an 
unauthorized means of capturing media, identities, 
patterns, and credentials that are used for subsequent 
unauthorized connections or other deceptive practices. 
Eavesdropping media, call pattern tracking, data mining, 
and reconstruction are attacks against confidentiality. An 
attack against integrity alters transmitted data or signaling 
traffic after being intercepted in the middle of the network. 
The alteration may consist of deleting, injecting, or 
replacing certain information in the transmitted VoIP 
traffic. The typical examples are call rerouting, call black 
holing, media injection, and media degrading. An attack 
against social context focuses on how to manipulate the 
social context between communication parties so that an 
attacker can misrepresent himself as a trusted entity and 
convey false information to the target user. The typical 
examples are misrepresentation (identity, authority, rights, 
and content), voice spam, instant message spam, presence 
spam, and phishing. 
To prevent  these attacks, and hence help the deployment 
of secured VoIP systems, VoIP signaling and media 
transmission protocols (SIP, H.323, IAX, and RTP) define 
specific security mechanisms as part of the protocols, or 
recommend combined solution with other security 
protocols (IPSec, SRTP, etc.) [1,2]. Actually, H.235 [1, 3] 
provides authentication, privacy and integrity for H-323 
framework [1, 2, 3]. SIP protocol [1, 5] describes several 
security features such as massage authentication, message 
encryption, media encryption, and network layer security. 
The IAX VoIP framework [6, 7, 8] allows message 
authentication and confidentiality, and supports NAT 
(Network Address Translation) and firewall traversal. In 
addition to the security capabilities of the VoIP protocols, 
specific security devices have been designed to enhance 
the security of VoIP systems [1, 2]. The security devices 
are primarily designed for providing security services like 
access control, intrusion detection, DoS protection, lawful 
interception, and so on. Examples of those devices are 
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VoIP-aware firewall, NAT, and SBC (Session Border 
Controller). The use of a single security device or 
mechanism cannot be sufficient to perfectly protect a VoIP 
system. Hence, a security policy incorporating different 
security schemes should be designed based on the analysis 
of the VoIP system vulnerabilities to ensure a perfect 
system security. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents an overview about VoIP architectures 
and protocols. First, we present the VoIP architectures. 
Then, we highlight the benefits leading to the ever-
growing of the VoIP popularity. After that, we present a 
brief overview about the main VoIP protocols. Section 3 
focuses on the actual VoIP vulnerabilities, meaning the 
flaws that may be exploited by an attacker to perform a 
security attacks. Section 4 presents an overview about the 
VoIP security attacks. We present a classification of the 
VoIP attacks into four categories based on the infected 
security service (availability, integrity, confidentiality, and 
authentication), as well as typical attack examples of each 
category. To prevent VoIP security attacks, VoIP 
protocols define specific security mechanisms as part of 
the protocols, or recommend combined solution with other 
security protocols which help the deployment of secured 
VoIP systems. Section 5 presents the security capabilities 
of the main VoIP protocols. In addition to the security 
capabilities of the VoIP protocols, specific security 
devices have been designed to enhance the security of 
VoIP systems. Section 6 presents the main VoIP security 
devices and shows the security potential of each device. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. BASICS OF VOIP TECHNOLOGY  
VoIP is a rapidly growing technology that delivers voice 
communications over Internet or a private IP network 
instead of the traditional telephone lines [1-4]. VoIP 
involves sending voice information in the form of discrete 
IP packets sent over Internet rather than an analog signal 
sent throughout the traditional telephone network. VoIP 
helps the provision of significant benefits for users, 
companies, and service providers. Cost savings, the 
provision of new communication services, phone and 
service portability, mobility, and the integration with other 
applications are examples of the VoIP benefits. Yet, the 
deployment of the VoIP technology encounters many 
difficulties such as architecture complexity, 
interoperability issues, QoS issues, and security concerns 
[1-4]. One of the main features of the VoIP technology is 
that it may be deployed using a centralized or a distributed 
architecture. Even though they are currently widely used, 
client-server VoIP systems suffer from many hurdles    [2, 
4]. In order to overcome the shortcomings of the client-
server model, the development community starts tending 
towards the deployment of the VoIP service using a peer-
to-peer decentralized architecture [2, 9, 12].  
In the following subsections, we first we highlight the 
benefits of the VoIP technology leading to the ever-
increasing of its popularity. Then, we present the main 
architectures used in the deployment of the VoIP 
technology. After that, we present a brief overview the 
most important VoIP protocols. Finally, we mention the 
main concerns of the VoIP technology. 
3.1 VoIP Benefits 
The key benefits of the VoIP technology are as follows [1, 
3, 4]: 
Cost savings: The most attractive feature of VoIP is its 
cost-saving potential. Actually, for users, VoIP makes 
long-distance phone calls inexpensive. For companies, 
VoIP reduces cost for equipment, lines, manpower, and 
maintenance. For service providers, VoIP allows the use of 
the same communication infrastructure for the provision of 
different services which reduces the cost of services 
deployment. 
Provision of new communication services: In addition to 
the basic communications services (phone, fax), the VoIP 
technology allows users to check out friends' presence 
(such as online, offline, busy), send instant messages, 
make voice or video calls, and transfer images, and so on.  
Phone portability: VoIP provides number mobility; the 
phone device can use the same number virtually 
everywhere as long as it has proper IP connectivity. Many 
businesspeople today bring their IP phones or soft-phones 
when traveling, and use the same numbers everywhere. 
Service mobility: Wherever the user (phone) goes, the 
same services will be available, such as call features, 
voicemail access, call logs, security features, service 
policy, and so on. 
Integration and collaboration with other applications:  
VoIP allows the integration and collaboration with other 
applications such as email, web browser, instant 
messenger, social-networking applications, and so on.  
3.2 VoIP Architecture 
One of the main features of the VoIP technology is that it 
may be deployed using a centralized or a distributed 
architecture [2, 4]. The majority of current VoIP systems 
are deployed using a client-server centralized architecture. 
A client-server VoIP system relies on the use of a set of 
interconnected central servers known as gatekeepers, 
proxy servers, or soft-switches. The central servers are 
responsible for users’ registration as well as the 
establishment of VoIP sessions between registered users. 
Figure 1 shows an example of a VoIP system deployed 
using the client-server architecture. As it is illustrated in 
the figure, each central server handles (registers, 
establishes a session with a local or a distant user, etc.) a 
  
 
 
Figure1: Client-Server VoIP Architecture: An illustrative example 
set of users. Each user must be registered on one of the 
central servers (registrar server) to be able to exchange 
data with other registered users. A user gets access to the 
service only over the registrar server. 
Even though they are currently widely used, client-server 
VoIP systems suffer from the following many hurdles. The 
main issues of the client-server VoIP systems are the 
presence of single points of failure (central servers), 
scalability, availability, and security [11]. In order to 
overcome the shortcomings of the client-server model, and 
help the development of scalable and reliable VoIP 
systems, the development communities start tending 
towards the deployment of the VoIP service using a peer-
to-peer decentralized architecture. Actually, a peer-to-peer 
VoIP system [2, 9, 12] allows service provision through 
the establishment of a symmetric collaboration between 
the system nodes (peers) communicating according to a 
given logic architecture (overlay). This helps the 
deployment of scalable, cost-effective, and more reliable  
systems VoIP systems. 
3.3 VoIP Protocols 
The deployment of any multimedia application such as 
VoIP, videoconference, or network gaming requires a 
signaling protocol  to set up sessions between end points, 
and a distinct protocol to transmit the media streams. The 
standard protocol used to exchange media streams 
between the endpoints of an established session.  
3.3.1 VoIP Media Transport Protocols 
The majority of VoIP systems rely on the use of the Real-
Time Transport Protocol (RTP) for data transmission 
during a VoIP session. Secure RTP (SRTP) has been 
recently proposed by the IETF as a secured version of the 
RTP protocol. 
RTP Protocol: Defined in RFC 3550, RTP protocol 
defines a standardized packet format for delivering audio 
and video over IP networks [1-4]. RTP is used in 
conjunction with the RTP Control Protocol (RTCP). 
While RTP carries the media streams (audio and video), 
RTCP monitors transmission statistics and the provided 
QoS and aids synchronization of multiple streams.  
  
 
SRTP Protocol: SRTP protocol defines a security profile 
of RTP, intended to provide the authentication, the 
confidentiality, and the integrity of RTP messages [1, 2]. 
Since RTP is used in conjunction with RTCP, SRTP is 
closely related to SRTCP (Secure RTCP) which is used to 
control the SRTP session.  
3.3.2 VoIP Signaling protocols 
Given that the majority of current VoIP systems are 
deployed using a client-server centralized architecture, in 
the subsequent,  we only consider the main signaling 
protocols used for the deployment of client-server VoIP 
systems; H323, SIP, and IAX. 
H323: Standardized by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), H323 [4] is the first 
signaling approach publicly used for the deployment of 
VoIP systems in conjunction with RTP protocol. H323 
standard encompasses many protocols such as H225, 
H245, and H235. H.225 defines call setup messages and 
procedures used to establish a call, as well as messages 
and procedures used for users registration, and call 
admission. H.245 defines control messages and procedures 
used to exchange communication capabilities such as the 
supported codec. H235defines security profiles for H.323, 
such as authentication, message integrity, signature 
security, and voice encryption. 
SIP: Allowing system flexibility and security, SIP is 
nowadays the most used VoIP signaling protocol [5]. SIP 
is an application layer protocol that works in conjunction 
with several other application layer protocols that identify 
and carry the session media. Media identification and 
negotiation is achieved with the Session Description 
Protocol (SDP). Media streams (voice, video) are 
transmitted using RTP protocol which may be secured by 
the SRTP protocol. For secure transmissions of SIP 
messages the Transport Layer Security (TLS) may be 
used. SIP also provides a suite of security services 
including DoS prevention, authentication, integrity, and 
confidentiality. 
IAX: Currently, IAX (Inter-Asterisk Exchange) is one of 
the most used approaches for the deployment of VoIP 
systems [6-8].  In contrast with H323 and SIP protocols 
which are limited to signaling tasks, IAX protocol ensures 
both signaling and media transmission in an IAX-based 
VoIP system. IAX provides a suite of security services. 
Actually, it allows message authentication and 
confidentiality, and supports NAT traversal. 
3.4 VoIP Disadvantages 
Even though it allows significant benefits, the VoIP 
technology suffers from many hurdles [1, 2]. In the 
following a brief presentation of the main VoIP 
disadvantages.   
Complicated service and network architecture: the 
integration of different services (voice, video, data, and so 
on) into the same network makes it difficult the design of 
the network architecture because different protocols and 
devices are involved for each service, and various 
characteristics are considered for each media. It also 
causes various errors and makes it harder to troubleshoot 
and isolate them. 
Interoperability issues between different applications, or 
products: Different protocols (H323, SIP, IAX, and 
MGCP) have been proposed for the deployment of VoIP 
systems. This leads to an interoperability issues between 
the VoIP devices developed based on different protocols. 
Interoperability issues still come up between products 
using the same protocol due to the multitude of protocol 
versions, and the ways of implementation.  
Quality of service (QoS) issues: The QoS aspect was not 
much considered when the IP technology was designed. 
That is why, the IP technology remains inefficient to 
support traffic with different QoS constraints despite the 
development of different approaches (DiffServ, IntServ) 
for the enhancement of the QoS provided by an IP 
network.  
Security issues: In the legacy phone system (PSTN: Public 
Switched Telephone Network), the main security issue is 
the interception of conversations that require physical 
access to phone lines. In VoIP security issues are much 
more than that. Actually, in VoIP systems many elements 
(IP phones, access devices, media gateways, proxy servers, 
and protocols) are involved in setting up a call and 
transferring media between two endpoints. Each element 
has vulnerable factors that may be exploited by attackers 
to carry out security attacks.  
Among the above presented disadvantages, VoIP security 
issues are becoming more serious because traditional 
security devices, protocols, and architectures cannot 
adequately protect VoIP systems from recent intelligent 
attacks. In the following sections, we present a deep 
analysis of the security issues of the VoIP technology. 
First, we present the main vulnerabilities of the VoIP 
systems. Then, we show how these vulnerabilities may be 
exploited by hackers to carry out different kinds of 
security attacks. Finally, we discuss how we can secure a 
VoIP system against security attacks. 
4 VULNERABILITIES OF VOIP SYSTEMS  
In system and network security, vulnerability is a flaw or a 
weakness that may be exploited by an attacker to carry out 
a security attack. VoIP has two types of vulnerability [1, 
2]. The first one is the inherited vulnerability which comes 
from the infrastructure (network, operating system, web 
server, and so on) used for the deployment of VoIP 
applications. The other is the vulnerability coming from 
VoIP protocols and devices, such as IP phone, voice 
gateway, media server, signaling controller, etc. 
The following subsections present the sources of 
vulnerabilities as well as the vulnerable components in a 
VoIP system. 
4.1 Sources of Vulnerabilities  
IP-Based Network Infrastructure: As the name VoIP 
implies, all traffic flows over IP networks and inherits the 
vulnerability of IP networks, such as malicious IP 
fragmentation, network viruses, or worms. 
  
 
Public Networks: In most cases, VoIP traffic is transmitted 
over Internet where anonymous people including hackers 
may send and receive traffic. 
Open VoIP Protocol: Most VoIP protocols, such as SIP or 
H.323, are standardized and open to the public. Hence, an 
attacker can create malicious client or server program 
based on the protocol specification in order to get access 
to a target VoIP servers or clients. Moreover, the openness 
of a VoIP protocol helps malicious people to identify and 
take advantage of its vulnerabilities. 
Voice and Data Integration: Even though it allows 
significant benefits, the integration of voice and regular 
data traffic in the same network results into new traffic 
engineering issues. Actually, the integration of traffic with 
different QoS and security requirements makes the traffic 
engineering tasks (securing, switching, queuing, and s on) 
more complex and difficult.  
Lack of Specific Security Mechanisms: While many data 
security mechanisms like firewalls may enhance the 
security of VoIP systems, it is still not enough to protect 
VoIP systems from today’s malignant attacks. 
Real-Time Media Transfer: Unlike common 
communication services like email, VoIP service requires 
a real-time transfer of media traffic which involves hard 
QoS constraints in terms of packet delay, and packet delay 
variation (jitter). Hence, minor packet delay or jitter could 
be recognized by users and impact the overall QoS. An 
attacker may overload the VoIP network (Calla flooding 
for example) to affect the provided QoS, and thus the 
system reliability. 
Exposed Interface: The majority of current VoIP systems 
are deployed using a client-server architecture. Even 
though, VoIP servers are located in a protected network, 
the interface modules receiving call requests are open to 
clients that are located in an open or public network. This 
allows attackers to perform a ports scan to find out the 
exposed interface modules, and then carry out a security 
attack (DoS for example) by sending malicious traffic. 
Endpoints Mobility: The PSTN (Public Switched 
Telephone Network) phone system assigns a dedicated 
phone line to a certain number. Thus, an attacker requires 
physical access to spoof the identity (the telephone number 
or line) of a regular user of the PSTN phone system. 
Unlike PSTN technology, VoIP phone systems allow 
endpoints mobility, which makes the protection against 
identity spoofing harder. 
4.2 Vulnerable Components 
In the following of this subsection, we present subsequent, 
a brief overview of the main vulnerable components 
involved in the deployment of a regular VoIP system [1, 
2].  
Operating system: VoIP applications are affected by the 
vulnerabilities of the operating systems are running on. 
The frequent security patches for the regular operating 
systems (Windows, Unix, Lunix) prove that they always 
have vulnerabilities. 
VoIP application: A VoIP application (Skype, Google 
Talk, etc.) itself may have security issues because of bugs 
or errors, which could make VoIP service insecure. 
VoIP protocols: The deployment of a VoIP application 
involves a signaling protocol (H323, SIP, IAX), and a 
media transmission protocol (RTP, RTCP). These 
protocols are vulnerable to different kinds of attacks which 
may affect the VoIP service provided based on these 
protocols.   
Management interface: For management purposes, the 
majority of VoIP devices have different service interfaces 
such as SNMP, SSH, Telnet, and HTTP. A service 
interface may be a source of vulnerability, especially when 
being configured carelessly. For example, if a VoIP device 
uses the default ID/password for its management interface, 
it is easy for an attacker to break in. 
TFTP Server: Many VoIP devices download their 
configurations from a TFTP server. An attacker could 
impersonate a TFTP server by spoofing the connection, 
and then distribute a malicious configuration to the VoIP 
equipment. 
Access device (switch, router): All VoIP traffic flows 
through access devices (switch, router) that are in charge 
of switching or routing. Compromised access devices 
could create serious security issues because they have full 
control of packets.  
Network: VoIP traffic is affected by the vulnerabilities of 
the IP network through which it is transmitted. An IP 
network vulnerability may be due to a bad configuration of 
a network device (switch, router, firewall, etc.) or a bug in 
one of the involved protocols (IP, UDP, and so on). 
5 VOIP SECURITY ATTACKS 
The VoIP vulnerabilities presented in the previous section 
may be exploited by hackers to carry out different kinds of 
security attacks. Attackers may disrupt media service by 
flooding traffic, collect privacy information by 
intercepting call signaling or call content, hijack calls by 
impersonating servers or impersonating users, make 
fraudulent calls by spoofing identities, and so on.  
There are many possible ways to categorize the security 
attacks. The first version of the IETF draft classified the 
security attacks into the following four categories: 
Interception and modification attacks, Interruption-of-
service attacks, abuse-of-service attacks, and social attacks 
[13]. In [2], the authors consider the following categories 
of VoIP security attacks: service disruption and 
annoyance, eavesdropping and traffic analysis, 
masquerading and impersonation, unauthorized access, 
and fraud. In [1], the author classifies the security attacks 
into four categories as follows: attacks against availability, 
attacks against confidentiality, attacks against integrity, 
and attacks against social context. 
In the following of this section, we present a brief 
overview about the main VoIP attacks according to the 
taxonomy presented in [1], which we adopt as it is the 
newest presented taxonomy compared to the other listed 
ones.  
  
 
5.1 Attacks against availability 
Attacks against availability aim at VoIP service 
interruption, typically in the form of Denial of Service 
(DoS). The main attacks against availability are: call 
flooding, malformed messages, spoofed messages, call 
hijacking, server impersonating, and Quality of Service 
(QoS) abuse. In the following, a brief presentation of these 
attacks. 
Call Flooding: an attacker floods valid or invalid heavy 
traffic (signals or media) to a target system (for example, 
VoIP server, client, and underlying infrastructure) which 
breaks down the system or drops its performance 
significantly.  
Malformed Messages: An attacker may create and send 
malformed messages to the target server or client for the 
purpose of service interruption. A malformed message is a 
protocol message with wrong syntax.  The server receiving 
this kind of unexpected message could be confused 
(fuzzed) and react in many different ways depending on 
the implementation. The typical impacts are as follows:  
infinite loop, buffer overflow, inability to process other 
normal messages, and system crash. 
Spoofed Messages: An attacker may insert fake (spoofed) 
messages into a certain VoIP session to interrupt the 
service, or steal the session. The typical example is call 
teardown. For this example, the attacker creates and sends 
a call termination message (for example SIP Bye) to a 
communicating device to tear down a call session. This 
attack requires the stealing of session information (Call-
ID) as a preliminary. 
Call Hijacking: Hijacking occurs when some transactions 
between a VoIP endpoint and the network are taken over 
by an attacker. The transactions can be a registration, a 
call setup, a media flow, and so on. This hijacking can 
make serious service interruption by disabling legitimate 
users to use the VoIP service. It is similar to call teardown 
in terms of stealing session information as a preliminary, 
but the actual form of attack and impact are different. The 
typical examples are registration hijacking, and media 
session hijacking. 
QoS Abuse: The elements of a media session are 
negotiated between VoIP endpoints during call setup time, 
such as media type, coder-decoder (codec) bit rate, and 
payload type. An attacker may intervene in this negotiation 
and abuse the Quality of Service (QoS), by replacing, 
deleting, or modifying codecs or payload type. Another 
method of QoS abuse is exhausting the limited bandwidth 
with a malicious tool so that legitimate users cannot use 
bandwidth for their service.  
5.2 Attacks Against Confidentiality 
Attacks against confidentiality provide an unauthorized 
means of capturing media, identities, patterns, and 
credentials that are used for subsequent unauthorized 
connections or other deceptive practices. The main types 
of confidentiality attacks are eavesdropping media, call 
pattern tracking, data mining, and reconstruction. 
Media Eavesdropping:  An unauthorized access to media 
packets. Two typical methods are used by attackers. One 
consists to compromise an access device (layer 2 switch 
for example) and duplicate the target media to an 
attacker’s device. The other way is that an attacker taps the 
same path as the media itself, which is similar to legacy 
tapping technique on PSTN. For example, the attacker 
may get access to the T1 itself and physically splits the T1 
into two signals. 
Call Pattern Tracking:  Call pattern tracking is the 
unauthorized analysis of VoIP traffic from or to any 
specific nodes or network so that an attacker may find a 
potential target device, access information (IP/port), 
protocol, or vulnerability of network. It could also be 
useful for traffic analysis; knowing who called who, and 
when.  
Data Mining:  The general meaning of data mining in 
VoIP is the unauthorized collection of identifiers that 
could be user name, phone number, password, URL, email 
address, strings or any other identifiers that represent 
phones, server nodes, parties, or organizations on the 
network. These information may be used by an attacker for 
subsequent unauthorized connections such as service 
interruptions, confidentiality attacks, spam calls, etc. 
5.3 Attacks Against Integrity 
Attack against integrity consists in the alteration of the 
exchanged traffic (signaling messages or media packets) 
after intercepting them in the middle of the network. The 
alteration can consist of deleting, injecting, or replacing 
certain information in the VoIP message or media. Call 
rerouting and black holing are typical examples of attacks 
against the integrity of the signaling traffic. Media 
injection and degrading are examples of media integrity 
attacks. 
Call Rerouting: An unauthorized change of call direction 
by altering the routing information in the signaling 
message. The result of call rerouting is either to exclude 
legitimate entities or to include illegitimate entities in the 
path of call signal or media.  
Media injection:  An unauthorized method in which an 
attacker injects new media into an active media channel. 
The consequence of media injection is that the end user 
(victim) may hear advertisement, noise, or silence in the 
middle of conversation.  
Media degrading: An unauthorized method in which an 
attacker manipulates media or media control packets 
relative to an established communication session in order 
to reduce the quality of data communication (QoS). For 
instance, an attacker intercepts RTCP packets in the 
middle, and changes the sequence number of the packets 
so that the endpoint device may play the media with wrong 
sequence, which degrades the quality. 
5.4 Attacks Against Social Context 
An attack against social context focuses on how to 
manipulate the social context between communicating 
entities so that an attacker can misrepresent himself as a 
trusted entity and convey false information to the target 
user (victim). The typical attacks against social context are 
  
 
misrepresentation of identity, authority, rights, and 
content, spam of call and presence, and phishing.  
Misrepresentation: It corresponds to the intentional 
presentation of a false identity, authority, rights, or content 
as if it were true so that the target user (victim) or system 
may be deceived by the false information. Identity 
misrepresentation is the method of presenting an identity 
with false information, such as false caller name, 
organization, email address, or presence information. 
Authority or rights misrepresentation is the method of 
presenting false information to an authentication system to 
obtain the access permit, or bypassing an authentication 
system. Content misrepresentation is the method of 
presenting false content as if it came from a trusted source 
of origin. It includes false impersonation of voice, video, 
text, or image of a caller. 
Spam: Call spam is defined as a bulk unsolicited set of 
session initiation attempts (INVITE requests), attempting 
to establish a voice or video communications session. If 
the user should answer, the spammer proceeds to relay 
their message over real-time media. Presence spam is 
defined as a bulk unsolicited set of presence requests (for 
example, SIP SUBSCRIBE requests) in an attempt to get 
on the “buddy list” of a user to subsequently carry out a 
call spam (INVITE request).  
Phishing: An illegal attempt to obtain somebody’s 
personal information (for example, ID, password, bank 
account number, credit card information) by posing as a 
trust entity in the communication. The typical method is 
that an attacker picks target users and creates request 
messages (SIP INVITE for example) with spoofed 
identities, pretending to be a trusted party. When the target 
user accepts the call request, the phisher provides fake 
information (for example, bank policy announcement) and 
asks for personal information. Some information like user 
name and password may not be directly valuable to the 
phisher, but it may be used to access more information 
useful in identity theft. 
6 SECURITY ABILITIES OF VOIP PROTOCOLS 
To prevent  the above presented attacks, and hence help 
the deployment of secured VoIP systems, VoIP protocols 
(SIP, H.323, IAX) define specific security mechanisms as 
part of the protocols, or recommend combined solution 
with other security protocols (IPSec, SRTP, etc.) [1, 2]. In 
the following subsections, we present a brief overview 
about the security abilities of the dominating protocols in 
the current VoIP systems: H323, SIP, and IAX for 
signaling and RTP/RTCP for media transport.  
6.1 H.323 Security Abilities  
Security for H.323 is described by the ITU-T standard 
H235"Security and Encryption for H-Series Multimedia 
Terminals" [1, 2, 4]. The scope of this standard is to 
provide authentication, privacy and integrity for H-323. 
Different profiles have been defined for the use of the 
H235 security protocol. Each profile is defined by a 
specific annex. Annex D describes a simple, password-
based security profile. Annex E describes a profile using 
digital certificates and dependent on a fully-deployed 
public-key infrastructure. Annex F combines features of 
both annex D and annex E.  
Annex D: Defines a simple, baseline security profile. The 
profile provides basic security by simple means, using 
secure password-based cryptographic techniques. This 
profile is applicable in an environment where a 
password/symmetric key may be assigned to each H.323 
entity (terminal, gatekeeper, gateway, or MCU). It 
provides authentication and integrity for H.225 protocols 
(RAS, and Q931), and tunneled H.245 using password-
based HMAC-SHA1-96 hash. Optionally, the voice-
encryption security profile can be combined smoothly with 
the baseline security profile. Audio streams may be 
encrypted using the voice-encryption security profile 
deploying Data Encryption Standard (DES), RC2-
compatible or triple-DES, and using the authenticated 
Diffie-Hellman key-exchange procedure. 
Annex E: Describes a security profile deploying digital 
signatures that is suggested as an option. H323 entities 
(terminals, gatekeepers, gateways, MCUs, and so on) may 
implement this signature security profile for improved 
security or whenever required. Typically, it is applicable in 
environments with potentially many terminals where 
password/symmetric key assignment is not feasible. The 
signature security profile overcomes the limitations of the 
simple, baseline security profile of Annex D.  
Annex F: Describes an efficient and scalable, public key 
infrastructure (PKI)-based hybrid security profile 
deploying digital signatures from Annex E and deploying 
the baseline security profile from Annex D. With this 
security profile, digital signatures from the signature 
security profile in annex E are deployed only where 
absolutely necessary, and highly efficient symmetric 
security techniques from the baseline security profile in 
Annex D are used otherwise. The hybrid security profile 
overcomes the limitations of the simple, baseline security 
profile of Annex D as well as certain drawbacks of Annex 
E, such as the need for higher bandwidth and increased 
performance needs for processing, when strictly applied.  
6.2 SIP Security Abilities 
The SIP protocol describes several security features [1, 2]. 
The main security features of the SIP protocol are: 
message authentication, message encryption, media 
encryption, transport layer security, and network layer 
security. Only message authentication is ensured by SIP 
protocol, and the others abilities are allowed by other 
security protocols such as S/MIME, SRTP/SRTCP, TLS, 
and IPSec. In the following, a brief presentation of the 
main security features of the SIP signaling protocol. 
Message Authentication: SIP ensures the authentication of 
signaling messages (REGISTER, INVITE, and BYE) to 
avoid registration hijacking attacks and prevent 
unauthorized calls and DoS or annoyance attacks. 
Message Encryption: SIP relies on the S/MIME 
(Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) protocol 
to encrypt the headers of the signaling messages (except 
the “Via”, and “Route” headers) which helps end-to-end 
  
 
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication between 
participants. S/MIME provides the flexibility for more 
granular protection of header information in SIP messages 
as it allows a selectively protection of SIP message fields. 
Media encryption: SRTP (Secure RTP) protocol ensures 
the encryption of media packets encryption which helps 
the guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of 
exchanged media. Section 5.4 details the security 
capabilities of SRTP protocol. 
Transport Layer Security (TLS): TLS protocol is used to 
provide a transport-layer security of SIP messages 
(requests, responses). Actually TLS ensures the encryption 
of entire SIP requests and responses which ensures the 
confidentiality and integrity of messages. 
Network Layer Security: SIP relies on the use of IPSec at 
the network layer which enhances the security of IP 
network communications by encrypting and authenticating 
data. IPSec is very useful to provide security between SIP 
entities, especially between a user agent (UA) and a proxy 
server.  
6.3 IAX Security Abilities 
As it is mentioned above, IAX allows message 
authentication and confidentiality, and supports NAT 
(Network Address Translation) and firewall traversal [6, 7, 
8]. Actually, IAX protocol was deliberately designed to 
work behind firewalls and devices performing NAT. 
Moreover, IAX includes the ability to encrypt the streams 
between endpoints with the use of an exchanged RSA key, 
or dynamic key exchange at call setup, allowing the use of 
automatic key rollover.  
6.4 RTP/RTCP Security Abilities 
Secure RTP (or SRTP) [1, 2] defines a profile 
of RTP Protocol, intended to provide confidentiality, 
integrity, and authentication to media streams in 
both unicast and multicast applications. In addition to 
protecting the RTP packets, SRTP provides protection for 
the RTCP streams. The designers of SRTP focused on 
developing a protocol that can provide adequate protection 
for media streams but also maintain key properties to 
support wired and wireless networks in which bandwidth 
or underlying transport limitations may exist. 
7 VOIP SECURITY DEVICES  
In addition to the security capabilities of the VoIP 
protocols, specific security devices have been designed to 
enhance the security of VoIP systems [1, 2]. The security 
devices are primarily designed for providing security 
services like access control, intrusion detection, DoS 
protection, and so on. Examples of those devices are 
VoIP-aware firewall, Network Address Translation 
(NAT), and Session Border Controller (SBC).   
7.1 VoIP-aware firewall 
A firewall is a key security device in an IP network 
allowing the protection of the internal network from 
external attacks. The general function is to block certain 
types of traffic based on the source/destination IP address, 
the used transport protocol (TCP, UDP), the 
source/destination port number, the traffic direction (input, 
output), and the traffic type (RTP, HTTP, SMTPP). VoIP 
traffic may be handled using a regular or a VoIP-aware 
firewall. Compared to a regular firewall which handles 
packets only at the network and transport layer, a VoIP-
aware firewall has the additional capability to inspect and 
manipulate VoIP packets at the application layer [1]. 
Actually, a VoIP-aware firewall allows:  
Inspection of protocol messages: consists to check out the 
integrity of protocol messages (SIP messages), and blocks 
the originator if it detects any malformed messages.  
Protection against DoS attacks: consists to detect any 
flooded messages and blocks the originator for a certain 
amount of time, based on a given policy. The policy may 
include number of call attempts per second, number of 
messages per second, number of invalid messages, etc. 
Control of the bandwidth utilization: It can assign 
maximum bandwidth for each endpoint (or group), and 
block any overused endpoint. 
7.2 Network Address Translation 
Network Address Translation (NAT) [1, 2] is a method of 
connecting multiple computers to the Internet (or any other 
IP network) using one IP address. This allows home users 
and small businesses to connect their network to the 
Internet cheaply and efficiently. NAT automatically 
provides firewall-style protection without any special set-
up. That is because it only allows connections that are 
originated on the inside network. This means, for example, 
that an internal client can connect to an outside FTP 
server, but an outside client will not be able to connect to 
an internal FTP server because it would have to originate 
the connection, and NAT will not allow that. It is still 
possible to make some internal servers available to the 
outside world via inbound mapping, which maps certain 
well know TCP ports (21 for FTP) to specific internal 
addresses, thus making services such as FTP or Web 
available in a controlled way. 
7.3 Session Border Controller 
Session Border Controller (SBC) [1, 2] is a controlling 
device located in a border of two network sessions. A 
network session may be an access network, a core 
network, and so on. For instance, from a VoIP service 
provider’s perspective, there are two network borders. One 
is between the customer’s access network and the core 
network (service provider’s network). The other is 
between the core network and the other service provider’s 
network (peer network). The role of a session border 
controller is to resolve border concerns that include 
interoperability and security issues. Security issues are 
mainly due to the exposure of a network session (a core 
network for example) to other network sessions (peer 
network, or a customer access network) which may help 
malicious users form a network session to attack resources 
(VoIP server, proxy, etc.) in another network session. 
However, interoperability issues are basically due to the 
  
 
interaction between network sessions using different 
devices and protocols. 
8 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a deep analysis of the 
security concerns of the VoIP technology. Firstly, we have 
presented a brief overview about the basics of the VoIP 
technology. Then, we have discussed the security 
vulnerabilities and attacks related to VoIP protocols and 
devices. After that, we have presented the countermeasures 
that should be considered to help the deployment of 
secured VoIP systems. A future work will address another 
important issue in the deployment of VoIP technology; the 
ability to support the QoS constraints of the voice and 
video applications.  
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